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ON THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF DE FINETTI’S
NOTION OF EVENT
TOMMASO FLAMINIO, LLUIS GODO, AND HYKEL HOSNI
Abstract. This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between
probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno
de Finetti’s conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective
nature of de Finetti’s interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer
form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epis-
temic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we
show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the
converse doesn’t hold: some probability values don’t represent decision-
relevant quantiﬁcations of uncertainty.
1. Introduction and motivation
This paper tackles the question as to whether the measure-theoretic concept
of probability provides a satisfactory quantiﬁcation of the uncertainty faced
by an idealised “rational” agent who is presented with a well-deﬁned choice
problem. This is one of the most fundamental questions in the ﬁeld of
uncertain reasoning and as such it has been the focus of heated debates in
various disciplines, from the foundations of probability and economic theory,
to artiﬁcial intelligence. We do not aim at reproducing the many facets of
this debate here. However, for the sake of putting our contribution into
perspective, we begin by recalling brieﬂy the relevant (to our purposes)
interpretations of the concept of “probability” and the decision-theoretic
argument supporting its use as a measure of “uncertainty”.1
1.1. Probability and uncertainty. Frequenstist interpretations of proba-
bility take the notion of uncertainty as a primitive, and spell it out through
the concept of random-mass phenomena (Po´lya, 1954, Ch 14). The distin-
guishing feature of random-mass phenomena is that they are unpredictable
in speciﬁc details, but predictable in the aggregate. A typical example is the
sex ratio of newly born babies. The sex of the next baby to be born at a given
hospital is unpredictable, but the country’s ratio of males to females tends
1For a compact introduction to the interpretations of probability and the justiﬁcation
of its use in quantifying uncertainty, readers are referred to Williamson (2009).
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to be very stable. The focus on random-mass phenomena leads naturally to
deﬁning probability as a theoretical limiting frequency. Under this interpre-
tation, probability measures uncertainty as an objective, agent-independent,
feature of the world. Subjective interpretations also take uncertainty to be a
primitive notion, but refrain from assuming that uncertainty is an objective
feature of the world. Hence uncertainty emerges as the psychological state
of an agent who is facing a well-deﬁned choice problem, say wether to buy or
not an additional travel insurance prior to ﬂying. Under this interpretation,
probability is justiﬁed as a measure of a rational agent’s degrees of belief by
making reference to the agent’s hypothetical choice behaviour (more on this
in the next Section).
Measure-theoretic probability, on the other hand, introduces the concept of
a probability measure from ﬁrst principles –Kolmogorov’s axioms– which do
not refer directly to any underlying interpretation of uncertainty. Standard
presentations of the subject (like, e.g. Billingsley, 1995; Ash, 1972) take the
probability space Ω to contain all the possible outcomes of some unspeciﬁed
experiment or observation, but insist that Ω is nothing but a set of points.
It is therefore immaterial whether subsets of such points are interpreted as
“repetitions” in a random-mass phenomenon (e.g. the sex ratio of newly
born babies) or single cases (e.g. getting ill whilst abroad). This neutrality
to interpretation may naturally suggest that measure-theoretic probability
should be regarded as the unquestionable core of the mathematical rep-
resentation of uncertainty, for it captures what two otherwise orthogonal
interpretations of probability have in common. A consequence of this line of
reasoning would then be that any remaining diﬀerences are not really of sub-
stantial consequence, but merely reﬂect personal philosophical taste. Whilst
a mathematically uniﬁed perspective on uncertainty is no doubt appealing,
we do believe that the interpretations of uncertainty are of substantial con-
sequence for our formal models. Hence the main purpose of this paper is to
show that a logical analysis of the foundations leads to discriminating among
formal properties of probability functions as measures of uncertainty. Our
conclusion will be that not all probability functions serve the purposes of
quantifying decision-relevant uncertainty equally well. By articulating this
in detail we will put ourselves in the footsteps of the subjective Bayesian
tradition, especially Bruno de Finetti’s.
From the point of view of de Finetti (1974), measure-theoretic probability
oﬀers no general justiﬁcation for applying the calculus of probability to rea-
soning about the uncertainty of single, non-repeatable events. In addition,
our ignorance of the boundary conditions of elementary “experiments” or
“observations” make the very notion of a “repeatable event” dubious in the
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least.2 In reaction to this, de Finetti points out that probability need not
arise by making assumptions about the repetition of (independent) events,
but is justiﬁed by imposing coherence to the degrees of belief of an agent who
is in a state of uncertainty. Coherence captures all the logico-mathematical
properties –essentially, additivity– that a probability function should satisfy
to allow for an adequate representation of decision-relevant uncertainty, i.e.
rational degrees of belief.3 In short, subjective Bayesianism eﬀectively re-
duces the meaning of probability to rational choice under uncertainty. This
is a central point, which deserves further development.
1.2. De Finetti’s choice problem. Throughout the paper we shall work
with a ﬁnite propositional language L. S(L) will denote the set of sentences
recursively built up, as usual, from L.
Suppose Γ ⊆ S(L). De Finetti’s starting point is that (classical) logic can
only help us distinguishing the conclusions which certainly (do not) follow
from Γ from those which Γ licenses as possible. Uncertainty, in this picture,
applies only to the domain of possibility. The quantiﬁcation of uncertainty
(i.e. the degree of belief that we attach to some relevant possibility being
true) is motivated primarily by our need to make rational decisions in the
face of such possibilities. Take again the travel insurance example. After
careful reﬂection we all know that we might be in need of medical assistance
abroad and our decision whether to buy the insurance that would cover for
it clearly must depend on our estimate of “how serious” such a possibility
is, for us, in that speciﬁc trip, etc..
In an abstract (as we shall shortly see) framework in which rational degrees
of belief are linked seamlessly to decision-making, a blatantly irrational deci-
sion must reveal irrational degrees of belief. This is the fulcrum de Finetti’s
justiﬁcation for measuring uncertainty with probability, an argument antici-
pated (independently and with important diﬀerences) by Borel and Ramsey
and brought to its full-ﬂedged decision-theoretic representation by Savage
(1972). Whilst de Finetti and Savage’s theorems are clearly beyond dis-
pute, the argument which rests on them –often referred to as the Dutch
2In the sex ratio example, for instance, it is very diﬃcult to isolate the appropriate
reference class for the ratio. The fact that we are observing one hospital gives us only
partial information about the population.
3In addition, a simple condition like exchangeability would suﬃce to recover the math-
ematics of probability which naturally springs out of the frequentist deﬁnition. This is, in
a nutshell, the import of de Finetti’s celebrated Representation Theorem – see (Paris and
Vencovska´, 2014, Ch 9) for a probability logic version of the result and (Savage, 1972, Ch
4) for its decision-theoretic interpretation.
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Book Argument– is not. To avoid unnecessary confusion, we will now re-
call the details of the set up which leads to identifying rational choice in de
Finetti’s choice problem, with rational degrees of belief. Our presentation
follows closely Paris and Vencovska´ (2014), whilst making explicit all the
assumptions originally made by de Finetti (1931).
The Argument consists of two parts. The ﬁrst links the informal notion of
degrees of belief to a numerical representation by identifying degrees of belief
with willingness to bet on a suitably deﬁned problem. The second step is
the (formal) result to the eﬀect that irrational degrees of belief (i.e. those
leading to sure loss in the betting problem) are avoided exactly if degrees of
belief are represented by probabilities.
1.2.1. Belief as willingness to bet. Let θ ∈ S(L), p ∈ [0, 1] and S ∈ R+.
A gamble is a real-valued function on S(L), that is to say a random vari-
able which depends on how the elements of S(L) are decided.4 The choice
between two gambles, F (·), and A(·) will play a central role in what follows.
The choice problem constructed by de Finetti for the purposes of his ar-
gument possesses the structure of a zero-sum game played by Bookmaker
and Gambler. Bookmaker starts by choosing, for each sentence θ in a set
Γ ⊆ S(L), a number p ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for a given sentence θ, Gambler must
choose S ∈ R and one between Fp(θ) and Ap(θ), i.e. whether to “bet For
or Against” θ. This leads to the payoﬀ matrix for Gambler illustrated in
Figure 1, where v(θ) = 1 (resp. v(θ) = 0) denotes the case where θ turns
out to be true (resp. false).
v(θ) = 1 v(θ) = 0
Fp(θ) S(1− p) −Sp
Ap(θ) −S(1− p) Sp
Figure 1. Gambler’s payoﬀ matrix.
Thus Fp(θ) is the payoﬀ that Gambler secures by betting S on θ at “odds”
p. Similarly, Ap(θ) is the payoﬀ for betting S against θ at “odds” p.
5
4This might give to some readers the impression of being unnecessarily general. This
worry will be cleared as we keep laying down the details of de Finetti’s choice problem.
Our usage of “gamble” conforms to that of Walley (1991).
5Choosing Fp(θ) means, in the intended interpretation, that Gambler pays out Sp to
Bookmaker. All monies, that is, are exchanged before (in an epistemic sense) the relevant
events in the book are decided. Therefore the intended interpretation of betting here is
that of horse races. We are grateful to Jon Williamson for drawing our attention to this
point.
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Remark 1.1. Note that if Gambler chooses to bet against θ, does so by
paying to Bookmaker the (negative) amount −S, if θ is true. Thus, for
given θ and p the choice between Fp(θ) and Ap(θ) amounts to choosing the
sign of stake S, that is to say the “side” of the bet. Since the combined
value of Fp(θ) and Ap(θ) is 0, Gambler’s choice of a negative S unilaterally
imposes a payoﬀ-swap to Bookmaker.
De Finetti assumes that Bookmaker and Gambler are ‘economically ratio-
nal’, i.e. prefer higher to lower payoﬀs. In addition they are idealised agents
in the sense of not being subject to computational limitations. Under those
assumptions, the above choice problem is suﬃcient to reveal an agent’s will-
ingness to bet on θ.
Let p ∈ [0, 1]. Fp(θ)  Ap(θ) abbreviates the expression “Gambler (weakly)
prefers betting on θ to betting against it at odds p”. It is immediate to note
that if p = 0, betting on θ returns Gambler a gain of S if v(θ) = 1 and a
loss of 0 otherwise, so it must be that Fp(θ)  Ap(θ). Similarly, if p = 1,
Gambler will always choose to bet against θ, i.e. Ap(θ)  Fp(θ), for doing
otherwise would violate the assumption that she is ‘economically rational’.
Suppose now 0 ≤ p′ < p ≤ 1 and that Fp(θ)  Ap(θ). Then it must still be
the case that Fp′(θ)  Ap′(θ), for decreasing p can only increase Gambler’s
gain if θ is true, and decrease it otherwise. It follows that the values of p for
which Fp(θ)  Ap(θ) form an initial segment of [0, 1].
Let pθ be the sup of the set {p | Fp(θ)  Ap(θ)}. Note that p is ﬁxed and pθ
can be read intuitively the highest price at which Gambler prefers betting
“on” θ. In other words if Gambler’s conﬁdence in the occurrence of θ is
greater than the price assigned by Bookmaker to θ in the book (i.e. p), then
‘economically rational’ Gambler will bet on θ because it is to her advantage.
But if it is not, then Gambler will certainly ﬁnd betting against θ to her
advantage. Then we are justiﬁed in identifying Gambler’s willingness to bet
on θ with pθ, for
• Fp(θ)  Ap(θ) if p < pθ
• Ap(θ)  Fp(θ) if pθ < p.
In the light of Remark 1.1 it is quite easy to anticipate that the only ‘econom-
ically rational’ solution to the interaction between Bookmaker and Gambler
takes place when Bookmaker sets p = pθ.
1.2.2. Coherence. So far θ has been kept ﬁxed. We are now interested in
looking at how gambles on distinct events in S(L) and with distinct stakes
must (not) be combined. The leading intuition here is that a rational agent
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cannot accept a series of gambles which, taken jointly, may lead them to sure
loss, i.e. loss under all valuations on S(L). The goal is to show that confor-
mity to the axioms of probability are necessary and suﬃcient for Bookmaker
to guarantee that Gambler will not lead him into sure loss.
Let V = {v | v is a {0, 1}-valuation on S(L)} and let v ∈ V. Recall that
the game begins with Bookmaker choosing θ and p. Let pθ be as above. If
p < pθ then Gambler will choose a positive S and pay p to secure a payoﬀ
S(v(θ)−p). If p > pθ, then Gambler will pick a negative S, thereby securing
a payoﬀ of −S(v(θ)− p).
De Finetti’s choice problem is a device to deﬁne operationally Bookmaker ’s
degrees of belief in relevant uncertainties of interest. Let Γ be a ﬁnite subset
of S(L). A book is a map B : Γ → [0, 1] which we interpret as the choice
made by Bookmaker to assign a value in [0, 1] to every sentence in Γ.
Such values are often referred to as the “betting odds” for the events. The
identiﬁcation of degrees of belief with willingness to bet in the choice problem
described in the previous section leads us to identifying the (ir)rationality of
Bookmaker with the properties of the books he writes. In the light of this,
the obvious property to be required is that the book B (on Γ) should not
be incoherent, i.e. it should not expose Bookmaker to the logical possibility
of sure loss. This is formalised by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1.1. Let Γ = {θ1, . . . , θk} be a ﬁnite subset of S(L). A book
B : Γ → [0, 1] is coherent iﬀ for no S1, . . . , Sk ∈ R, Bookmaker’s balance∑k
i=1 Si(B(θi)− v(θi))
is negative for all valuations v ∈ V.
As shown by (de Finetti, 1931), this criterion is necessary and suﬃcient
for the existence of a ﬁnitely additive measure P on the boolean algebra of
formulas, such that P (θi) = B(θi) for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Under the assumption that Bookmaker is ‘economically rational’, an inco-
herent book reveals irrational degrees of belief because it exposes Bookmaker
(who chose it) to the possibility of sure loss. Under the modelling assump-
tion that the choice problem (writing the book) is an exhaustive description
of Bookmaker’s behaviour, willingness to incur sure loss is certainly to be
equated with irrationality.
Deﬁnition 1.2. Say that p is a fair price for gamble F if the Gambler is
indiﬀerent between betting “on” or “against” θ at price p, i.e., if Fp(θ) 
Ap(θ) and Ap(θ)  Fp(θ). Equivalently, when p = pθ.
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This leads to the Dutch Book theorem:
Theorem 1.1 (de Finetti (1931)). Incoherent books are avoided if and only
if prices are fair.
The identiﬁcation of the intuitive notion of irrationality with the mathe-
matically precise one of writing an incoherent book captured by Theorem
1.1 requires a number of abstractions on the nature of the choice problem.
Those abstractions mark a clear separation between de Finetti’s choice prob-
lem and real-world gambling. More speciﬁcally, de Finetti (1931) assumes
that the game takes place under the following contractual obligations
Completeness: The choice made by Bookmaker is forced for (boolean)
combinations of gambles and, after the book has been written, Book-
maker is forced to accept all of a potentially inﬁnite number of trans-
actions with Gambler.
Swapping: After reading the published book, Gambler bets by paying
to Bookmaker a real-valued stake of her choice. Since Gambler, as re-
marked above, can choose negative stakes (betting negative money),
she can unilaterally impose a payoﬀ-matrix swap to Bookmaker.
Rigidity: The transactions between Gambler and Bookmaker corre-
spond to a small amount of money (in some currency).
Completeness is justiﬁed by de Finetti (1931) on the grounds that it pro-
vides the following modelling constraints. Were Bookmaker allowed to refuse
selling certain bets, his choice behaviour (i.e. his choice of odds for a partic-
ular book) could not be claimed to reveal his sincere degrees of belief on the
relevant events, and as a consequence, the betting problem would fail its fun-
damental purpose of connecting a rational agent’s degrees of belief to their
willingness to bet. As he would retrospectively notice, the betting problem
is a “device to force the individual to make conscious choices, releasing him
from inertia, preserving him from whim” (de Finetti, 1974, p.76).
In the presence of Completeness, Swapping entails that Bookmaker’s de-
grees of belief should be fair betting odds. For suppose Bookmaker were
to publish a book with non-zero expectation. Then he could be forced into
sure loss by Gambler, who would put a negative stake on the book. Note
that the abstraction leading to fair betting odds is justiﬁed only if the agents
involved are idealised. This amounts to saying that Bookmaker confronts an
individual who will exploit every logical possibility of leading him to sure
loss, no matter how computationally demanding this might be.
Finally, Rigidity is a technical assumption which de Finetti endorses in order
to avoid the potential complications arising from the diminishing marginal
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utility of money (de Finetti, 1974, p.77-78). By requiring payments to be
small, he can eﬀectively dispense with the notion of utility.
1.3. Events and the epistemic structure of the betting problem.
Besides the above contractual obligations, the Dutch Book Argument rests
on an epistemic structure which de Finetti mentions only in passing in his
major contributions to this topic de Finetti (1931, 1937, 1974). A more
direct, albeit very informal, reference to the point appears in de Finetti
(2008). For reasons that will be apparent in a short while, the underlying
epistemic structure of the betting problem is fundamental to understanding
the notion of event.
An event is, for de Finetti, any random variable which takes values in the
binary set and which, in addition, satisﬁes the properties of being a single
and well-deﬁned case . Single is opposed to “repeatable”, and this marks the
clear separation between the subjectivist and the frequentist interpretations
of probability recalled above. The second requirement has attracted less
attention despite the crucial role it plays in making probability subjective.
For de Finetti an event is “well-deﬁned” when it stands for a question for
which (a) neither Gambler nor Bookmaker have a deﬁnite answer –a ques-
tion which pertains to the domain of possibility– and (b) Gambler and Book-
maker agree on the conditions under which this question will be answered:
[T]he characteristic feature of what I refer to as an “event” is
that the circumstances under which the event will turn out
to be “veriﬁed” or “disproved” have been ﬁxed in advance.
(de Finetti, 2008, p.150)
This very informal characterisation echoes the characterisation de Finetti
gives of random quantities –of which events are special cases. A random
quantity is a “well-determined” unknown, namely one which is so formulated
as “to rule out any possible disagreement on its actual value, for instance,
as it might arise when a bet is placed on it.” (de Finetti (1974), Section
2.10.4).
In addition to the above, de Finetti remarks that events must be the bearers
of “genuine” uncertainty:
I call “event” whatever is the object of an explicit question
or curiosity. In other words, an event is something which
has been previously ﬁgured out and subsequently checked in
order to see whether it took place or not. (de Finetti, 2008,
p. 151) (p. 151)
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The formalisation of this idea will be the main object of our investigation
for the rest of this paper.
In order to address the question as to whether a sentence θ ∈ S(L) is “well-
deﬁned” in the above sense –and hence it can be said to represent an event–
we suppose that Gambler ﬁnds herself in a certain epistemic state w ∈ W
which is deﬁned as a partial valuation on S(L). We assume that epistemic
states are dynamic in the sense that some propositional variables which are
not decided at w may be decided at future states, until all propositional
variables in L are eventually decided. Yet not all epistemic states in W may
be accessible to Gambler at w. This allows for the possibility that Gambler
may never be in a position to ascertain whether θ is decided positively or
negatively. Similarly for Bookmaker.
This background allows us to put forward a deﬁnition of events which is
relative to the state of information w of the individuals involved in the
choice problem. Let θ ∈ S(L). We say that θ is
• a w-fact if the truth value of θ is decided at w;
• a w-event if it is not a w-fact, and every w′ ∈ W which determines
the truth value of θ (up to redundancy) is w-accessible;
• w-inaccessible if no state w′ which decides θ is accessible from w.
Section 4 will be devoted to a formalisation of the above which in turn will
lead us to introduce choice-based probabilities, as partial functions
Cbp : S(L) → [0, 1]
satisfying, among others, the following constraints
Cbp(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 ∈ {0, 1}, if θ is a fact
0, if θ is inaccessible
x ∈ [0, 1], if θ is an event
undeﬁned otherwise.
The epistemic structure implicit in the betting framework clearly builds on
the presupposition that at the time of betting, Bookmaker and Gambler
ignore the truth value of the event on which they are betting, i.e. they
agree that the truth value of θ is currently unknown. Hence the event
belongs to the domain of possibility. Yet, for the bet to be meaningful,
i.e. payable at all, the agents must also agree on the conditions which
will decide the truth value of θ. This implies that a betting interpretation
of probability is meaningful only for sentences which are undecided at the
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time of betting, but whose truth values will eventually be accessible to the
agents. Now, w-inaccessible sentences are certainly well-formed formulas
escaping this restriction, so probability functions deﬁned on them cannot
have a decision-relevant interpretation.
Our central result is a reﬁnement of the classical representation theorem
for probability functions (Theorem 2.1 below). Before doing that we show
that whilst all coherent choice-based probabilities are indeed probability
functions, probabilities which are deﬁned on sentences which are not events
can coherently only be given trivial values. Trivial, in this context, means
one of two things. Either a sentence can (coherently) be given only its
truth value (and this characterises betting on facts), or it should be given
0. This means that, given an epistemic state, the “uncertainty mass” must
be concentrated only on events and on facts. Since events and facts are
deﬁned relative to the agents’ own epistemic state, this determines to a
crucial extent the subjective nature of their rational degrees of belief.
As a conclusion to our introductory remarks, let us pause for a second to
appreciate that the epistemic structure of de Finetti’s choice problem leads
inevitably to a subjective interpretation of probability. For whether a sen-
tence qualiﬁes as an event depends on the state of information of the in-
dividuals involved in the betting problem. Compare this with the logical,
measure-theory inspired, characterisation of probability functions which is
derived under the tacit assumptions that the agent’s state of information is
empty and that all future “states of information” will be accessible, that is
to say, that the set of events coincides with the algebra of sentences of a lan-
guage L. By relaxing both assumptions our framework will lead to isolating
the subset of all probability functions deﬁned over a logical language that
bear a meaningful interpretation with respect to de Finetti’s choice problem.
2. Formal preliminaries
Recall that L = {p1, . . . , pn} is a ﬁnite set of propositional variables, and
S(L) = {θ, φ, . . .} denotes the set of sentences built as usual from L in
the language of classical propositional logic. Denote by ATL be the set of
maximally elementary conjunctions of L, that is the set of sentences of the
form α = p11 ∧p22 ∧. . .∧pnn , with i ∈ {0, 1} and where p1i = pi and p0i = ¬pi,
for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Since L is ﬁnite, the Lindenbaum algebra Lind(L)6 on L is a ﬁnite Boolean
algebra and hence it is atomic, with atoms corresponding to ATL. In addi-
tion, ATL is in 1-1 correspondence with the set V of (classical) valuations on
L. This implies that there is a unique valuation satisfying v(α) = 1 namely
vα(p
i
i ) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Conversely, given a valuation v ∈ V there exists
a unique atom α ∈ ATL such that v(α) = 1. Now let
Mθ = {α ∈ ATL | α |= θ},
where |= denotes the classical Tarskian consequence. Since there exists a
unique valuation satisfying α, say vα, by deﬁnition of |= it must be the case
that vα(θ) = 1. Thus
Mθ = {α ∈ ATL | vα(θ) = 1}.
This framework is suﬃcient to provide a very general representation theorem
for probability functions.
Theorem 2.1 (Paris 1994).
(1) Let P be a probability function on S(L).7 Then the values of P are
completely determined by the values it takes on ATL = {α1, . . . , αJ},
as ﬁxed by the vector
〈P (α1), P (α2), . . . , P (αJ)〉 ∈ DL = {a ∈ RJ | a ≥ 0,
J∑
i=1
ai = 1}.
(2) Conversely, ﬁx a = 〈a1, . . . , aJ〉 ∈ DL and let P ′ : S(L) → [0, 1] be
deﬁned by
P ′(θ) =
∑
i:αi∈Mθ
ai.
Then P ′ is a probability function.
In words, Theorem 2.1 shows that every probability function arises from
distributing the unit mass of probability across the J = 2n atoms of the
Lindenbaum algebra generated by L = {p1, . . . , pn}.
Our goal is to reﬁne this result by isolating a class of sentences on which, we
argue, there should be no distribution of “epistemically signiﬁcant” mass.
6Recall that the Lindenbaum algebra Lind(L) over L is the quotient set S(L)/ ≡,
where ≡ is the logical equivalence relation (deﬁned as θ1 ≡ θ2 iﬀ |= θ1 ↔ θ2), with the
operations induced by the classical conjunction, disjunction and negation connectives.
7P : S(L) → [0, 1] is a probability function on sentences if (i) P () = 1 where  denotes
any tautology, (ii) P (θ1 ∨ θ2) = P (θ1) + P (θ2) if |= ¬(θ1 ∧ θ2), and (iii) P (θ1) = P (θ2) if
|= θ1 ↔ θ2.
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More speciﬁcally, we aim at building a framework in which those probabili-
ties which bear a meaning as betting quotients can be formally distinguished
from those which do not. As illustrated informally in the previous section,
we will achieve this by providing a rigorous deﬁnition of de Finetti’s notion
of events, which will be distinguished from the related notion of facts and
inaccessible sentences.
3. Epistemic states and partial information
In what follows, we denote subsets of S(L) by capital Greek letters Γ,Δ, . . .,
and the classical Tarskian consequence is denoted by either |= or Cn de-
pending on whether its relational or operational deﬁnition is more suited to
the speciﬁc context. Recall that a (total, classical) valuation is a function
v : L → {0, 1} which extends uniquely to the sentences in S(L) by truth-
functionality. A total valuation represents a fully speciﬁed epistemic state
since it allows agents to decide the truth-value (either 1 or 0) of any sentence
in S(L). However, an epistemic state determined by a set Γ of sentences
(the ones known to be true), permits an assignment of truth-values only
to some subset of sentences. More precisely, each Γ uniquely determines a
three-valued map on S(L), eΓ : S(L) → {0, 1, u}, deﬁned as
eΓ(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if θ ∈ Cn(Γ),
0 if ¬θ ∈ Cn(Γ),
u otherwise.
(1)
where the value u reads as unknown.
Notice that partial valuations are not truth-functional. Note also that, if
Γ ⊆ Γ′ then Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(Γ′). From now on, we will say that a mapping
e : S(L) → {0, 1, u} is a partial valuation whenever there exists Γ ⊆ S(L)
such that e = eΓ.
Given two partial valuations e, e′, we say that e′ extends e, written e ⊆ e′,
when the class of formulas which e sends into {0, 1} is included into that
one which e′ sends into {0, 1}. Note that if e = eΓ and e′ = eΓ′ then
e ⊆ e′ ⇔ Γ ⊆ Γ′. (2)
By a theory we mean a deductively closed subset of S(L). So, Γ is a theory
if and only if Cn(Γ) = Γ. We denote the set of theories on L by T. Let
us ﬁnally recall that a theory Γ ∈ T is maximally consistent iﬀ for every
θ ∈ S(L), either Γ |= θ, or Γ |= ¬θ. Note also that for any maximally
consistent Γ ∈ T, there exists a (total) valuation v ∈ V such that for all
θ ∈ S(L), eΓ(θ) = v(θ).
ON THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF DE FINETTI’S NOTION OF EVENT 13
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Determined sentences). We say that Γ ⊆ S(L) determines
θ ∈ S(L), written Γ  θ, if and only if, for any propositional variable pi
appearing in θ, eΓ(pi) ∈ {0, 1}.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Decided sentences). We say that Γ ⊆ S(L) decides θ ∈
S(L), written Γ θ if and only if eΓ(θ) ∈ {0, 1}.
The diﬀerence between the two notions can be rephrased by noting that θ
may be decided even if not all of its propositional variables are determined
(for instance, if it is a disjunction with at least a true disjunct). Conversely,
it is immediate to see that for all Γ ⊆ S(L) and θ ∈ S(L), if Γ  θ then
Γ  θ. Furthermore, as remarked above, if Γ ∈ T is maximally consistent,
then Γ  θ ⇔ Γ θ. The following are also immediate consequences of the
deﬁnitions.
Proposition 3.1. For all Γ ⊆ S(L), and for all θ, ϕ ∈ S(L), the following
hold:
(1) Γ  θ iﬀ Γ  ¬θ; Γ θ iﬀ Γ ¬θ.
(2) If Γ θ, and Γ ϕ, then Γ θ ◦ ϕ for all ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}.
(3) If Γθ, Γ  ϕ, and eΓ(θ) = 0 then Γ  θ◦ϕ for every ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→},
but Γ  θ ∧ ϕ and Γ  θ → ϕ, and in particular eΓ(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0,
eΓ(θ → ϕ) = 1.
(4) If Γθ, Γ  ϕ, and eΓ(θ) = 1 then Γ  θ ◦ϕ for every ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→
}, but Γ  θ ∨ ϕ, Γ  ϕ → θ and Γ  θ → ϕ, and in particular
eΓ(θ ∨ ϕ) = eΓ(ϕ → θ) = 1.
We can associate naturally an agent’s state of information with
(1) the sentences which are decided for the agent at that state
(2) those sentences which are undecided at the current state, but that
can be decided in a future, reachable (for that agent) state.
The formalisation of this is an attempt to capture de Finetti’s rather elusive
remark to the eﬀect that the “conditions of veriﬁcation” of an event are
known in advance to the agents. In doing this we will focus on decided
rather than on determined sentences.
4. Information frames: facts, events and inaccessible sentences
4.1. Information frames.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Information frame). An information frame F is a pair
〈W,R〉 where W is a non-empty subset of partial valuations deﬁned as in
Equation (1) and R is a binary transitive relation on W .
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Remark 4.1. Since each partial valuation is uniquely determined by a Γ ⊆
S(L), we can freely use w1, w2, . . . to denote either subsets of S(L) or their
associated partial valuations, depending on which interpretation suits best
the speciﬁc context. As a consequence of Equation (2) the inclusion w ⊆ w′
is always deﬁned.
We interpret wi ∈ W as the basic component of an agent’s state of informa-
tion, i.e. the sentences (equivalently, the partial valuation) which capture all
and only the information available to an agent who ﬁnds itself in state wi.
Under this interpretation the relation R models the agent’s possible tran-
sitions among information states. For reasons that will soon be apparent,
we always require R to be transitive. As more structure is needed, further
restrictions on R will be considered.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let F = 〈W,R〉 be an information frame. We say that F
is
(1) Monotone if (w,w′) ∈ R implies w ⊆ w′.
(2) Complete if w ⊆ w′ implies (w,w′) ∈ R.
Under our interpretation, monotonicity captures the idea that agents can
only learn new information, but never “unlearn” the old one. In addition,
monotonicity implies that the dynamics of information is stable in the sense
that once a formula is either determined or decided at state w (i.e. it is given
a binary truth-value), this remains ﬁxed at any information state accessible
from w. Hence if w  φ, there cannot exist (w,w′) ∈ R such that w′  φ.
Moreover, by monotonicity, the truth-value of φ in w coincides with the
truth-value of φ in w′. Completeness ensures that the agent will learn all
the possible consistent reﬁnements to its current information state. So, if
(w,w′) ∈ R, there exists θ such that w′ θ and w¬θ. Finally, note that if
F is monotonic and complete then obviously R coincides with set-inclusion
among states (equivalently, sets of sentences).
4.2. Facts, events and inaccessible sentences. We are now in a posi-
tion to give formal deﬁnitions of facts, events and inaccessible sentences in
monotone information frames.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, let w ∈ W ,
and let θ ∈ S(L). We say that θ is a w-fact if w  θ.
On the other hand, if w  θ, we say that θ is:
• a w-event if for every (total) valuation v extending w there exists w′
with (w,w′) ∈ R such that w′  θ and w′(θ) = v(θ).
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• w-inaccessible if for every (total) valuation v and every world w′ such
that w′(θ) = v(θ), (w,w′) ∈ R.
We shall respectively denote by F(w), E(w) and I(w) the class of w-facts,
w-events, and w-inaccessible sentences, for some information frame 〈W,R〉
and some w ∈ W .
In addition, we shall denote by C(w) the class F(w) ∪ E(w) ∪ I(w). The
class C(w) collects, for a given information frame F and a state w, all those
elements of S(L) which are well-deﬁned in the choice-based sense illustrated
in Section 1.2 above.8 As we will shortly see C(w) is, in general, strictly
contained in S(L) and hence there exist elements of S(L) which do not
meet de Finetti’s criterion of being well-deﬁned. The following example
clariﬁes the idea.
Example 4.1. Consider a Turing Machine TM and a ﬁnite input x. Let θ
to be the halting problem statement:
“TM(x) will stop”.
Let w be a state in which the agents know nothing about TM(x). Suppose
now that Bookmaker is writing a book involving θ. The undecidability of the
halting problem forces any information frame F which claims to be adequate
for this bet, to make inaccessible all those states in which ¬θ (i.e. “TM(x)
will run forever”) is true. Let us assume that Bookmaker and Gambler
consider those states in which θ is accessible. Let us call W↓ and W↑ the
disjoint sets of partial states in which, respectively, TM(x) stops and hence
w′(θ) = 1 for all w′ ∈ W↓ and TM(x) does not stop, i.e. w′′(¬θ) = 1 for all
w′′ ∈ W↑. Then θ ∈ C(w). To see this note that
(1) Clearly θ is not a w-fact since w  θ,
(2) In order for θ to be a w-event, by deﬁnition, every partial state
deciding θ should be accessible from w. Yet every w′′ ∈ W↑ is not
accessible, hence θ is not a w-event.
(3) Finally, θ is not w-inaccessible either. In fact, in order for θ to be
w-inaccessible, every partial state deciding θ should be inaccessible,
whilst every w′ ∈ W↓ is w-accessible in F .
Notice that if every w′ ∈ W↓ were w-inaccessible, θ would be in I(w). 
8It proves to be particularly hard to provide natural conditions under which S(L) is
partitioned by facts, events and inaccessible formulas. We hope to succeed in doing this
in further work.
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The following proposition sums up some key properties of the sets F(w),
E(w) and I(w).
Proposition 4.1. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, and let
w ∈ W . Then the following hold:
(1) The structure 〈F(w),∧,¬,⊥〉 is a Boolean algebra.
(2) If w is a total valuation, then S(L) = F(w), while if w = ∅ is the
empty valuation, then F(w) = ∅.
(3) If 〈W,R〉 is complete, then 〈E(w),∧,¬,⊥〉 is a Boolean algebra.
(4) If 〈W,R〉 is complete, then for all w ∈ W , S(L) = F(w) ∪ E(w).
Therefore, in particular, if 〈W,R〉 is complete, then I(w) = ∅.
(5) If I(w) = ∅, then for every w′ such that its corresponding valuation
is total, (w,w′) ∈ R.
Proof. (1) follows by Proposition 3.1 (parts (1) and (2)). Also the claim (2)
is also immediate.
In order to show (3), let 〈W,R〉 be a complete and monotone information
frame, and let θ, ϕ ∈ E(w). Let us assume by way of contradiction, that
θ ∧ ϕ ∈ E(w). Then, since clearly w  θ ∧ ϕ, it means that there exists a
total valuation V which extends w, and a w′ ⊇ w such that w′  θ ∧ ϕ, but
(w,w′) ∈ R, against the completeness of 〈W,R〉.
(4) Assume that 〈W,R〉 is complete, and let w be any state in W . Since
〈W,R〉 is monotone by hypothesis, R =⊆, and hence, for every w′ ∈ W ,
(w,w′) ∈ R iﬀ w ⊆ w′. Then, for every θ ∈ S(L), either θ ∈ F(w), or
w  θ. In the latter case, for every total valuation V and each w′ such
that V (θ) = w′(θ), if w′ ⊇ w, then (w,w′) ∈ R (by monotonicity and
completeness). Hence θ ∈ E(w).
(5) Assume that θ ∈ I(w). Then, since every total valuation V  θ, by def-
inition of inaccessible formula, the world w′ whose corresponding valuation
is V cannot be accessible from w. And hence the claim holds. 
Note that, for an arbitrary information frame 〈W,R〉 and for a w ∈ W , it is
not always the case that the class E(w) is closed under logical connectives
and hence, in particular, 〈E(w),∧,¬,⊥〉 may not be a Boolean algebra. For
this reason, within our framework, and in contrast with the classical setting,
we shall avoid, in general, to speak about the algebra of events, while we
shall more frequently refer to the class of events. The following example
illustrates the point.
Example 4.2. Let L = {p, q} with the following intuitive interpretation:
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w
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
w8
Figure 2. In accord with Heisenberg’s principle the infor-
mation frame is such that states w1, w2, w3, w4 are accessible
from w, unlike those states in which both variables are de-
cided, namely w5, w6, w7 and w8.
• p reads “the electron ε has position π”;
• q reads “the electron ε has energy η”.
Suppose further that our agent is in a state w such that the truth value of
both p and q are unknown. In the usual quantum mechanics interpretation,
an agent in w may either learn the position of ε, or its energy, but not both.
This gives rise to the information frame depicted in Figure 2 where we may
assume the following conditions hold:
w1  p, w1  q, and w1(p) = 0; w2  p, w2  q, and w2(p) = 1;
w3  q, w3  p, and w3(q) = 0; w4  q, w4  p, and w4(q) = 1;
w5  p, q, and w5(p) = w5(q) = 1 w6  p, q, and w5(p) = w5(q) = 0.
w7  p, q, and w7(p) = 0, w7(q) = 1 w8  p, q, and w8(p) = 1, w8(q) = 0.
It is immediate to see that p and q are w-events, but p ∧ q is not. Indeed,
due to the inaccessibility of, say w5, the total valuation V mapping p and
q to 1 has no correspondence in the worlds which are accessible from w.
Analogously, ¬p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q and ¬p ∧ ¬q are not w-events either. 
Examples 4.1 and 4.2 point out that in arbitrary monotone information
frames one cannot ensure that the sets F(w), E(w), I(w) form a partition
of S(L). As we will discuss in further detail in the concluding section, it is
surprisingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd natural properties on frames which ensure the
rather desirable property that S(L) = C(w). When the information frame
is also complete then we trivially get this condition since I(w) = ∅.
5. De Finetti’s choice problem revisited
We are now in a position to provide the epistemic reﬁnement to the formal-
isation of de Finetti’s betting problem, as anticipated in Section 1.2 above.
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Deﬁnition 5.1. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, let Γ =
{θ1, . . . , θk} ⊆ S(L) and let B : Γ → [0, 1] be a book.
(1) For w ∈ W , the book B is said to be w-coherent iﬀ
(a) θ1, . . . , θk ∈ C(w),
(b) there exist no S1, . . . , Sk ∈ R such that for every w′ ∈ W such
that (w,w′) ∈ R,
k∑
i=1
Bali < 0
where, for all i = 1, . . . , k,
Bali =
{
Si(B(θi)− w′(θi)), if w′  θi
SiB(θi), otherwise.
(2) The book B is said to be w-Dutch if B is not w-coherent.
(3) The book B is said to be a w-book, if every θi is a w-event.
Note that part (1.b) implies that inaccessible sentences do not enter the
Bookmaker’s balance. Hence even if Gambler placed bets on elements of
I(w), Bookmaker would not be under a contractual obligation to pay any-
thing to Gambler. Moreover, for w-books, being w-coherent is a notion that
collapses to de Finetti’s own deﬁnition of coherence (Deﬁnition 1.1). In fact
if all the θi’s are w-events, by deﬁnition, every state accessible from w de-
cides θ and hence the book is w-coherent if and only if it is coherent. On
the other hand, a w-coherent w-book can be extended to coherent w-books,
as shown by the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Let (W,R) be a monotone information frame, let w ∈ W
and let B : θi ∈ Γ → βi ∈ [0, 1] be a w-coherent w-book. Let ϕ be a sentence
in C(w) which is not a w-event and consider the book B′ = B ∪ {(ϕ, α)}.
Then:
(1) if ϕ is a w-fact, then B′ is w-coherent iﬀ α = w(ϕ),
(2) if ϕ is w-inaccessible, B′ is w-coherent iﬀ α = 0,
Proof: (1). (⇒). Suppose, to the contrary, that α = w(ϕ), and without loss
of generality suppose that w(ϕ) = 1, so that α < 1. Then, Gambler can
get sure proﬁt by betting a positive S on ϕ. Since the information frame
is monotone, by the deﬁnition of w-book, w(ϕ) = 1 holds in every world
w′ accessible from w. Thus Gambler pays S · α in order to surely receive S
in any such w′. Conversely, suppose w(ϕ) = 0 and, for contradiction, that
α > 0. Then it is easy to see that Gambler can secure a win by swapping
payoﬀs with Bookmaker, i.e. by betting a negative amount of money on ϕ.
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(⇐). Since B is w-coherent, there exists a w′ accessible from w that decides
every θi, and such that, for every S1, . . . , Sn, S ∈ R,
n∑
i=1
Si(βi − w′(θi)) = 0.
Since ϕ is a w-fact and w′ is accessible from w, it follows that w′(ϕ) =
w(ϕ) = α. Therefore for S ∈ R, one also has(
n∑
i=1
Si(βi − w′(θi))
)
+ S(α− w′(ϕ)) = 0
and hence B′ is also w-coherent.
(2). (⇒). Suppose α > 0. By the “economic rationality” assumption
described in Section 1.2 Gambler is willing to bet S > 0 on ϕ, i.e. to pay
α · S to Bookmaker. But since ϕ is w-inaccessible, this means sure loss for
Gambler, contradicting her rationality.
(⇐). Since B is w-coherent and since by hypothesis α = 0, B′ extends B
in way which is trivial in the following sense: given any stakes S1, . . . , Sn, S
on B′, the amount paid to Bookmaker is
∑
i Siβi + Sα =
∑
i Siβi + 0.
Yet, since ϕ is w-inaccessible, in every world w′ accessible from w, she
will get
∑
i Siw
′(θi) + Sw′(ϕ). Now, since ϕ ∈ I(w), w′(ϕ) = u. The
interpretation of the choice problem detailed in Section 1.2 forces us to put
Sw′(ϕ) = Su = 0. For the Rigidity assumption (recalled at the end of
Section 1.2.1 above) requires Su to be the monetary amount Gambler gets
from Bookmaker after ϕ is decided. Hence the coherence of B′ follows from
the coherence of B. 
The following example illustrates that w-coherent w-books cannot be charac-
terised, in general, within the standard axiomatic framework for probability.
Example 5.1. Let L = {r, d} which read as follows
r : “Tomorrow it will rain in Russell Square, London”,
d : “Last winter α raindrops fell on Russell Square, London”.
Let w0 represent the agents’ epistemic state in which neither r nor d are
decided, i.e. w0  r, w0  d. Now, whilst they will certainly agree that
tomorrow r will be easily decided, Bookmaker and Gambler will probably
agree that d is impossible to decide. A suitable information frame to capture
this is as follows. Let W = {w0, . . . , w4} be such that
w1  r, w1  d, w1(r) = 1 w2  r, w2  d, w2(r) = 0
w3  d, w3  r, w3(d) = 1 w4  d, w4  r, w4(d) = 0,
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and let R be as in Figure 3.
w0
w1
w2
w3
w4
Figure 3. An information frame where, according to Exam-
ple 5.1, the two states w1 and w2 in which r is decided are
accessible from w0 (the present state), while the two states
w3 and w4 where d is decided are not.
Now, let B(X) be the Boolean algebra whose elements are Boolean combi-
nation of r and d and whose atoms are r ∧ d, ¬r ∧ d, r ∧ ¬d and ¬r ∧ ¬d.
Also, Let P be probability measure induced (for instance) by the uniform
distribution on the above atoms.
Therefore, in particular, we have P (r ∧ d) = 1/4, P (r) = P (d) = 1/2 and
hence, the book
B = {(d, 1/2), (r, 1/2)}
is coherent in the sense of de Finetti.
However, Theorem 5.1 shows that B is not w0-coherent since the unique
possible w0-coherent value for w0-inaccessible statement must be 0. 
The example illustrates that measure-theoretic probability is too wide a
framework to represent the kind of uncertainty which motivates de Finetti’s
choice problem. The remainder of this paper is devoted to ﬂeshing out
a suitable reﬁnement of probability functions –choice-based probabilities–
which are constrained by the notion of w-coherence.
6. Choice-based probability functions
Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, and let w ∈ W and let
X ⊆ S(L). Abusing the notation, let S(X) denote the set of formulas
S(V ar(X)) built from the propositional variables appearing in the formulas
of X. Finally, let Tw = {ϕ ∈ S(X) | w(ϕ) = 1}.
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Deﬁnition 6.1. We say that a partial map
Cbpw : S(X) → [0, 1]
is a w-choice based probability with respect to X, if the following conditions
are satisﬁed for any θ, ψ ∈ S(X):
C0. Cbpw is deﬁned on θ iﬀ θ ∈ C(w).
C1. if θ, ϕ, θ∨ϕ ∈ F(w)∪E(w), and Tw |= ¬(θ∧ϕ), then Cbpw(θ∨ϕ) =
Cbpw(θ) + Cbpw(ϕ).
C2. if θ ∈ F(w), Cbpw(θ) = w(θ).
C3. if θ ∈ I(w), Cbpw(θ) = 0.
C4. if θ, ψ ∈ C(w) and Tw |= θ ↔ ψ, then Cbpw(θ) = Cbpw(ψ).
Notice that although a w-choice based probability Cbp is deﬁned over all
formulas in the set of C(w), the additivity property C1 is only required
on events and facts. Indeed, Cbp cannot be additive on I(w). To see
this assume ϕ ∈ I(w). Then ¬ϕ ∈ I(w) as well. Now, by C3, we have
Cbp(ϕ) = Cbp(¬ϕ) = 0, but ϕ∨¬ϕ ∈ F(w) which moreover is a tautology.
Hence by C2, it should be Cbp(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = 1.
Deﬁnition 6.2. Let w,w′ be partial valuations and let X ⊆ S(L). We say
that w and w′ are incompatible w.r.t. X, written w⊥Xw′, if there exists
θ ∈ X such that w  θ, w′  θ, and w(θ) = w′(θ). We write wXw′, to say
that w,w′ are not incompatible.
The intuition behind incompatible partial valuations is that, if w⊥w′, then
w cannot be a reﬁnement of w′ since they do not assign the same truth value
to the same decided sentence.
For ﬁxed w ∈ W and X ⊆ S(L), let d(X,w) be the set of all those accessible
states w′ ∈ W deciding every (w-fact and) w-event in X. Formally,
d(X,w) = {w′ ∈ W : (w,w′) ∈ R and w′θ for all θ ∈ X ∩ (E(w)∪F(w))}.
Notice that we are excluding in the condition sentences of X which are
neither w-events, nor w-facts, nor w-inaccessible.9
Finally let D be a set of states obtained from d(X,w) in such a way that
the states in d(X,w) and those in D decide the same sentences, but for each
w′, w′′ ∈ D, w′⊥Xw′′. Sets D obtained in this way will be called w-decisive
for X. More formally:
9Notice that d(X,w) may be empty, see next Proposition 6.1.
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Deﬁnition 6.3. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, let w ∈ W
and let X ⊆ S(L) such that d(X,w) = ∅. A set D ⊆ d(X,w) is called a
w-decisive set for X whenever the following conditions hold:
• for all ϕ ∈ X, if w′ϕ for all w′ ∈ D, then w′′ϕ for all w′′ ∈ d(X,w).
• for all w′, w′′ ∈ D, w′⊥Xw′′.
We denote by D(X,w) the set of all the w-decisive sets for X.
Example 6.1. Let L = {p, q, r}, X = {p ∨ q} and let
W = {w,w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8}
be such that
(1) w(p) = w(q) = u, so w  p and w  q;
(2) w1(p) = 1, w1(q) = u, w1(r) = u so w1  p and w1  q;
(3) w2(p) = 0, w2(q) = u, w2(r) = u, so w2  p and w2  q;
(4) w3(p) = w3(q) = 1, w3(r) = u, so w3  p and w3  q;
(5) w4(p) = 1, w4(q) = 0, w4(r) = u, so w4  p and w4  q;
(6) w5(p) = 0, w5(q) = 1, w5(r) = u, so w5  p and w5  q;
(7) w6(p) = w6(q) = 0, w6(r) = u, so w6  p and w6  q;
(8) w7(p) = w7(q) = w7(r) = 0, so w7  p, w7  q, w7  r;
(9) w8(p) = w8(q) = 0, w8(r) = 1, so w8  p, w8  q, w8  r.
Let 〈W,R〉 be depicted as in Figure 4. Then p ∨ q is a w-event, because
w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8 are the states whose associated partial valuations co-
incide with the restriction to {p, q} of every total valuation V . Moreover
w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8 are accessible from w. For a similar reason p is a w1-
event, and q is a w2-event. Finally notice that whilst p ∨ q is a w2-event,
p ∨ q is a w1-fact.
Moreover the following hold
(1) D1 = {w3, w4, w5, w6} is w-decisive for X, while
(2) D2 = {w1, w5, w6} is not w-decisive for X because (w,w1) ∈ R;
(3) D3 = {w2, w3, w4} is not w-decisive for X since w2  p ∨ q;
(4) D4 = {w1, w5, w7, w8} is again not w-decisive for X since (w,w1) ∈
R;
(5) D5 = {w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8} is not w-decisive forX because w6Xw7,
and w6Xw8 as well;
(6) D6 = {w5, w7, w8} is w2-decisive for X.
(7) D7 = {w5, w6} is also w2-decisive for X.

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w
∅
w1
p
w2
¬p
w3 q
w4 ¬q
w5 q
w6
¬q w7 ¬r
w8 r
Figure 4. The information frame of Example 6.1. Note
that each node represents a partial valuation in W and it is
labelled (in various orientations) by the propositional vari-
ables it decides. Since the frame is transitive and monotone,
we only label a state with the propositional variables which
are decided at that state for the ﬁrst time. A variable is
undecided at wi if it doesn’t label any wj with j ≤ i.
The following properties will turn out to be useful for a description of Choice-
based probability functions.
Proposition 6.1. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, let w ∈ W
and let X ⊆ S(L). Then the following properties hold true:
(1) For all D ∈ D(X,w) the following holds:
(a) for all w′, w′′ ∈ D, w′⊥Xw′′,
(b) for every total valuation v, there exists w′ ∈ D, such that
w′(θ) = v(θ) for all θ ∈ X ∩ (F(w) ∪ E(w)).
(c) If θ ∈ X is w-inaccessible then {w′ ∈ D : w′ θ, (w,w′) ∈ R} =
∅. In particular, if X ∩ I(w) = ∅ then D(X,w) = {∅}.
(2) Let X ′ = X ∩ (E(w) ∪ F(w)). Then D(X,w) = D(X ′, w).
Proof. The properties in (1) follow by deﬁnition of w-decisive sets for X.
Finally, (2) is a direct consequence of (c) of item (1) above. 
Remark 6.1. As we already stressed any decisive setD for a setX of formulas
is made of incompatible partial valuations w ∈ W deciding every formula
in X. Decisive sets are then suitable domains for probability distributions.
In particular, for X ⊆ E(w) ∪ F(w), although the information frame F
might not allow us to reach some total valuations, it is easy to see that
D(X,w) = ∅, and therefore we are allowed to distribute a probability mass
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on at least a decisive set D ∈ D(X,w). Our next result shows that Choice-
based probabilities arise in this way.
Theorem 6.1. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame, let w ∈ W and
let X ⊆ S(L). Let D ∈ D(X,w) be w-decisive for X and let π : D → [0, 1]
be a mapping satisfying ∑
w∈D
π(w) = 1.
Then the map Cbp : S(X) → [0, 1] deﬁned for all θ ∈ C(w) ∩ S(X) by
Cbp(θ) =
∑
w′∈D,w′θ
π(w′) · w′(θ), 10
is a w-choice based probability
Proof. Clearly Cbp ranges over [0, 1], and it is likewise clear that Cbp is
additive on E(w)∪F(w). Moreover, if |= θ ↔ ψ, then for all w′ ∈ D, w′ θ
iﬀ w′ψ. Therefore, Cbp(θ) = Cbp(ψ). Hence C0, C1 and C4 of Deﬁnition
6.1 are immediately seen to hold.
To check C2, suppose θ ∈ F(w). As we showed above, w(θ) = w′(θ) for each
w′ ∈ D. So it suﬃces to check two cases. If w(θ) = 1, then
Cbp(θ) =
∑
w′∈D
π(w′) · w′(θ) =
∑
w′∈D
π(w′) = 1 = w(θ); (3)
On the other hand, if w(θ) = 0, then
Cbp(θ) =
∑
w′∈D
π(w′) · 0 = 0 = w(θ). (4)
Therefore, Cbp(θ) = w(θ) for all θ ∈ F(w), giving us Cbp() = 1, as
required.
Finally C3. Let θ ∈ I(w). In this case, from Proposition 6.1 (2), it follows
that for no w′ ∈ D, w′θ, and hence Cbp(θ) = 0, completing the proof. 
The next result shows that Choice-based probability functions characterize
w-coherence.
Theorem 6.2. Let 〈W,R〉 be a monotone information frame. Let X ⊆
S(L), and let B : X → [0, 1] be a book. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) B is w-coherent,
(2) There exists a w-choice based probability Cbp on S(X) extending B.
10We assume the sum is 0 in case the set of partial valuations w′ satisfying the condi-
tions w′ ∈ D and w′  θ is empty.
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Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). If B is w-coherent, then so is the book B− obtained by
restricting B to the formulas in X ′ = X ∩ (E(w)∪F(w)). Since X ′ does not
contain w-inaccessible formulas, B− is w-coherent and hence the obvious
adaptation of de Finetti’s Dutch Book theorem to our language shows that
B′ is w-coherent iﬀ one can ﬁnd a probability distribution π on D. Then
the map Cbpπ deﬁned as in Theorem (6.1) satisﬁes (2).
(2) ⇒ (1). Let Cbp′ the partial mapping on S(L) deﬁned by restricting Cbp
to E(w). Then the claim easily follows from Theorem 5.1. 
The above Theorem, together with Proposition 4.1 (4), shows that de Finetti’s
notion of coherence is a special case of w-coherence, which arises by impos-
ing monotonicity and completeness to the information frame 〈W,R〉. More
precisely, the following holds:
Corollary 6.1. Let 〈W,R〉 be monotone and complete, with w ∈ W . Let
X ⊆ S(L), and let B : X → [0, 1]. Then the following are equivalent
(1) B is w-coherent,
(2) B is coherent,
(3) There exists a w-choice based probability Cbp on S(X) extending B,
(4) There exists a probability P on S(X) extending B.
Remark 6.2. In the light of the above Corollary 6.1, one can argue that
Choice-based probability collapses to the usual notion of a probability mea-
sure whenever the agents who are engaging in de Finetti’s betting problem
have ‘full access’ to the sort of complete information provided by classical
valuations on L. The fact that some valuations may not be accessible from
a given state of information (i.e. that some sentences may not be w-events,
for some w ∈ W of interest) is ultimately what distinguishes Choice-based
probability from its measure-theoretic counterpart. Consider again Example
4.1. Whilst it certainly makes “abstract” sense to ask the probability that
a Turing Machine TM will halt on a given input x11, there is no Choice-
based probability which, coherently with the information frame described
in the Example 4.1, will assign to the event “TM(x) will stop” a positive
value. Note that this does not lead to contradiction, but it clariﬁes how
Choice-based probabilities are, in general, a strict reﬁnement of probability
measures. We will come back to a related point in the concluding section of
the paper.
11G. Chaitin (cf. for instance Calude (2002)) introduces, for any Turing Machine TM
the real number ΩTM which is meant to represent the halting probability of TM . The
number ΩTM is clearly not-computable. We refer the interested reader to Calude (2002)
for more details.
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7. Choice-based probabilities as probability measures on
quotient structures
We end this paper by comparing Choice-based probability functions, and
their characterisation of w-coherence with the standard representation the-
orem for probability functions (Theorem 2.1 above.) In what follows we will
always assume that the information frame we are working with is monotone
and complete. Recall from Section 4.2 and Proposition 4.1, that among
other things, this implies that (i) the accessibility relation R coincides with
set-inclusion ⊆ and that (ii) for all w ∈ W , I(w) = ∅. Finally, recall that
for monotone and complete frames, either θ ∈ E(w) or θ ∈ F(w), for all
θ ∈ S(L). For this reason, instead of S(L) as domain for a choice based
probability, we work directly with the Lindenbaum algebra Lind(L) of for-
mulas built up on the language L.
Let w ∈ W , and let F(w) be partitioned in F(w)+ and F(w)− where for
every θ ∈ F(w)+, w(θ) = 1 and for all ψ ∈ F(w)−, w(ψ) = 0. Then let
K(w) = F(w)+ ∪ {¬ψ : ψ ∈ F(w)−}.
Notice that the set K(w) can be regarded as encoding the knowledge con-
tained in the word w. By convention we identify each formula θ in S(L) with
its equivalence class (modulo equiprovability) [θ] ∈ Lind(L), and hence each
θi will be thought of as an element in the Lindenbaum algebra Lind(L).
Let us denote by I(K(w)) the ideal of Lind(L) generated by K(w). In other
words, let
I(K(w)) = {ϕ ∈ Lind(L) : ϕ ≤
∨
{θ : θ ∈ K(w)}}.
Since K(w) will be always clear, we simply write I instead of I(K(w)). Since
the quotient algebra Lind(L)/I is ﬁnite, we denote by At(Lind(L)/I) the
atoms of Lind(L)/I. More precisely, we denote the atoms of Lind(L)/I by
aI1, . . . , a
I
k. Finally, by identifying each ideal of Lind(L) with its associated
congruence (see (Burris et al., 1981, Theorem 3.5)), we denote by [θ]I the
generic element of the quotient structure Lind(L)/I.
Lemma 7.1. For every w ∈ W , At(Lind(X)/I) ∈ D(Lind(L), w).
Proof. (Sketch). Clearly, for each ai, aj ∈ At(Lind(X)/I), ai⊥Lind(L)aj .
Moreover, to each atom ai ∈ At(Lind(X)/I) we can associate a complete
valuation as we explained in Section 2. Since the information frame we are
considering is complete, all (total) valuations are accessible and hence the
claim is settled. 
The following lemma is straightforward.
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Lemma 7.2. Let A be an atomic Boolean algebra with atoms α1, . . . , αk.
If I is an ideal of A, and αj ∈ I for some j, then, in the quotient structure
A/I, it holds [αj ]I = [0]I.
In analogy with Theorem 2.1, let us deﬁne:
DLind(L)/I = {a ∈ Rk : k = |At(Lind(L)/I)|, ai ≥ 0,
k∑
i=1
ai = 1}.
The following result oﬀers a representation of Choice-based probabilities in
terms of probability distributions on the atoms of suitably deﬁned quotient
structures.
Theorem 7.1. For every w ∈ W , for every a ∈ DLind(L)/I, and for every
θ ∈ Lind(L), the map Cbp deﬁned as
Cbp(θ) =
k∑
i: αi∈Mθ
ai (5)
is a Choice-based probability.
Conversely, for every Choice-based probability Cbp, there exists a unique
a ∈ DLind(L)/I such that Cbp is deﬁned by a through (5).
Before proving the above theorem, let us notice that the function Cbp de-
ﬁned through (5) can be easily regarded as a probability measure PBet on
the quotient structure Lind(L)/I, by setting Cbp(θ) = PBet([θ]I).
Proof. Fix w ∈ W , let as usual k = |At(Lind(L)/I)|, and, for the sake of a
simpler notation, let us denote by α1, . . . , αk the atoms of Lind(L)/I. Let
hence a ∈ DLind(L)/I, and let Cbp be deﬁned as in (5). Then Cbp satisﬁes
the following:
(1) If θ ∈ F(w), then θ ∈ I, and hence from Lemma 7.2, [θ]I = [0]I.
Therefore, since Cbp is deﬁned as a probability measure on the quo-
tient structure Lind(L)/I, Cbp(θ) = 0.
(2) Clearly, if θ ∈ E(w), by deﬁnition of Cbp, Cbp(θ) ∈ [0, 1].
It follows from the monotonicity and completeness of 〈W,R〉 that I(w) = ∅,
and hence Cbp is a Choice-based probability.
Conversely, take any Cbp and let a = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ Rk be such that
ai = Cbp(αi), i = 1, . . . , k
where k denotes, as usual, the cardinality of At(Lind(L)/I). Then ai ∈ [0, 1],
for i = 1, . . . , k. Then the claim follows from Theorem 2.1 by observing that
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Cbp(αi) = PBet([αi]I), and that PBet is a probability measure on Lind(L)/I.

Theorem 7.1 then generalises Theorem 2.1, which is recovered by adding the
extra assumption that w corresponds to the empty valuation, i.e. νw is such
that νw(p) undetermined for all p ∈ V .
Conversely it is easy to prove that, whenever w is such that its correspond-
ing valuation νw is total (i.e. νw(p) ∈ {0, 1} for each p ∈ V ), the unique
possible w-choice based probability on Lind(L) is trivial and coincides with
the canonical homomorphism hw : Lind(L) → Lind(L)/I since, in this
particular case Lind(L)/I is the two-element Boolean algebra 2.
8. Conclusions and future work
We ﬂeshed out a logical framework which enabled us to show that some
measure-theoretically sound probability values are trivial in the choice-based
setting of subjective Bayesianism, as described in Section 1.2. We then ar-
gued that the restriction to the subclass of Choice-based probability func-
tions developed in Section 6 arises naturally from the epistemic structure
of events implicitly assumed by de Finetti (1931) in his operational def-
inition of subjective probability. In addition, our formalisation of events
(Deﬁnition 4.3) captures de Finetti’s epistemological analysis to the eﬀect
that probability is the quantiﬁcation of one’s state of mind concerning gen-
uine uncertainty, i.e. what pertains to the domain of what one coherently
considers to be possible.
Whilst we focussed on the choice problem leading to the Dutch Book ar-
gument, it is interesting to ask if our framework can be applied also to
the method of scoring rules.12 Let us ﬁrst recall a central observation by
de Finetti (1981):
it is clear that the condition of rejecting any Dutch Book
cannot be violated in any fair betting situation, but both com-
petitors may be misled about the state of information of the
other.13 For this reason betting, strictly speaking, does not
pertain to probability but to the Theory of Games. Only
under such a proviso can the argument be accepted.
In an attempt to keep the foundations of probability within the scope of
Decision, rather than Game Theory, de Finetti developed the method of
12We are grateful to Gregory Wheeler for raising this point.
13Our emphasis.
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“proper scoring rules”. In a nutshell, the framework features a single agent
who must assign probabilities to events of interest. In terms of the analysis
put forward in this paper, it is natural to identify the agent with Bookmaker,
whose task is to choose a point in [0, 1] representing his degree of subjective
belief in, say θ. Call this pθ. The idea is to set up a device which gives
Bookmaker an incentive to choose pθ in such a way that this reﬂects his
sincere degree of belief in θ, call this psθ. In order to achieve this, de Finetti
suggests that Bookmaker should be subject to a loss which amounts to the
square of the (Euclidean) distance between his probabilistic forecast for θ
and the truth-value that θ will eventually get in some w ∈ W . This loss
function is also known as Brier’s rule or score. A simple geometric argument
shows that the expectation of loss under Brier’s score is minimised when
pθ = p
s
θ. As shown in (de Finetti, 1974, Ch.3) the minimisation of loss
under Brier’s rule is equivalent to the criterion of avoiding sure loss in the
Dutch Book setting recalled above. Now, it is intuitively clear that our
restriction of events to the class of sentences that can be decided in all future
developments of an agent’s information states applies to Brier’s scoring rule
as well. To see this informally, note that if the forecast is not on an event (in
the sense of Deﬁnition 4.3 above ), Bookmaker is not eﬀectively facing the
prospect of an enforceable penalisation. For forecasting on an inaccessible
sentence will make it impossible to compute the loss. Hence the restriction
to elements of E(w) appears to be implicit in the method of scoring rules
and appears not to depend on a particular choice of loss function. Further
work is needed to turn this intuitive observation into a mathematical fact.
Besides putting de Finetti’s analysis on a ﬁrm logical footing, we believe
that the framework of Choice-based probabilities introduced in this paper
will prove to be a fruitful tool for foundational clariﬁcation as well as formal
advance in uncertain reasoning, broadly construed. We end the paper by
sketching our vision for future research in this direction.
As our key motivation was to capture formally the informal characterisa-
tion of events put forward by de Finetti, we made a number of assumptions
concerning the idealisation of the agents and the abstraction of the choice
problem in accord with his version of the Dutch Book Argument. In ad-
dition, our reﬁnement of the Argument investigated in detail in Section 5,
depended on two assumptions on information frames, namely transitivity
and monotonicity, reﬂecting two important idealisations on the nature of
the agents. Further work will be devoted to exploring the signiﬁcance, in
terms of modelling uncertainty, of relaxing those assumptions. Relaxing
transitivity amounts to making our agents capable of accessing only states
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which are immediately accessible from w0. Modelling this sort of “short-
sightedness” will shed interesting light on those problems in which accuracy
is to be traded-oﬀ with speed. Reasoning based on heuristics and case-based
reasoning are certainly cases in point. The relaxation of monotonicity would
allow us to model cognitively limited agents who are subject to potentially
imperfect recall. This strand of research could open fruitful interactions
with the experimental literature on the eﬀect of limited memory on logical
inference.
In addition we will focus our future research on a slightly more general
notion of information frame that we are now going to describe. Recall,
that we deﬁned the relation R featuring in information frames 〈W,R〉 in a
binary way: either w∗ is accessible from a state w, or it is not. In realistic
scenarios however, it certainly makes sense to consider cases in which agents
may attach a degree to w∗ being accessible from w. This leads to deﬁning
(w,w∗) ∈ Rα (where α ∈ [0, 1]) if they believe that the probability of reaching
w∗ from w is α. Notice that such a probability α would measure a higher
order of uncertainty than the degree of belief the agent attaches to a w-event.
This second-order uncertainty could be interpreted fruitfully as a measure
of the reliability of the model, along the lines described in Hosni (2014).
Finally a glimpse at the applicability of our framework in the wider ﬁeld of
uncertain reasoning. We proved that whilst all Choice-based probabilities
are normalised, monotonic and additive set-functions, the converse doesn’t
hold. Hence, the currently heated debate concerning the (in)adequacy of
“probability” as a measure of rational belief under uncertainty, may greatly
beneﬁt from being framed in the context of Cbps. We claim that under the
restrictions provided by w-coherence, the identiﬁcation of “rational belief”
with “probability” is beyond reasonable dispute. Normative shortcomings
of Cbp’s are thus to be found in the severe restrictions imposed by the
abstraction of the underlying choice problem discussed in detail in Section
1.2 above. In future research we will investigate the relaxation of some of the
abstraction of de Finetti’s choice problem and its consequences for Cbp. The
ﬁrst such relaxation will follow the footsteps of Fedel et al. (2011) and drop
the Swapping assumption recalled above. This will open to the investigation
of interval-valued Choice-based probabilities.
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